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Abstract
The value of a finite-state two-player zero-sum stochastic game with limit-average payoff can
be approximated to within ε in time exponential in a polynomial in the size of the game times
polynomial in logarithmic in 1
ε
, for all ε > 0.
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1 Introduction
A zero-sum stochastic game is a repeated game over a finite state space, played by two players.
Each player has a non-empty set of actions available at every state, and in each round, each player
chooses an action from the set of available actions at the current state simultaneously with and
independent from the other player. The transition function is probabilistic, and the next state is
determined by a probability distribution depending on the current state and the actions chosen by
the players. In each round, player 1 gets (and player 2 loses) a reward depending on the current
state and the actions chosen by the players. The players are informed of the history of the play
consisting of the sequence of states visited and the actions of the players played so far in the play.
A strategy for a player is a recipe to extend the play: given a finite sequence of states and pairs of
actions representing the history of the play, a strategy specifies a probability distribution over the
set of available actions at the last state of the history. The limit-average for player 1 reward of a
pair of strategies σ and π for player 1 and player 2, respectively, and a starting state s is defined as
v1(s, σ, π) = E
σ,π
s lim inf
n→∞
[
1
n
·
n∑
i=1
r(Xi,Θi,1,Θi,2)
]
,
where Xi is the random variable for the state reached at round i of the game, and Θi,j is the
random variable for the action played by player j at round i of the game, under strategies σ and
π and starting state s, and r(s, a, b) gives the reward at state s for actions a and b. The form
of the objective explains the term limit average. First the average is taken with respect to the
expected rewards in the first n rounds of the game. Then the objective is defined as the liminf of
these averages. A stochastic game with a limit-average reward is called a limit-average game. The
fundamental question in stochastic games is the existence of a value, that is, whether
sup
σ∈Σ
inf
π∈Π
v1(s, σ, π) = inf
π∈Π
sup
σ∈Σ
v1(s, σ, π),
1
where Σ and Π denote the sets of strategies for player 1 and player 2, respectively.
Stochastic games were introduced by Shapley [16], who showed the existence of a value in
discounted games, where the game stops at each round with probability β, for some 0 < β < 1, and
the goal of a player is to maximize the expectation of the total sum of the rewards. Limit-average
games were introduced by Gillette [7], who studied the special cases of perfect information (in each
round, at most one player has a choice of moves) and irreducible stochastic games. The existence
of a value for the perfect information case was proved in [10]. Gillette’s paper also introduced a
limit-average game called the Big Match, which was solved in [5]. Bewley and Kohlberg [4] then
showed how Pusieux series expansions can be used for the asymptotic analysis of discounted games.
This, and the winning strategy in the Big Match, was used by Mertens and Neyman [11] to show
the existence of a value in limit-average games.
While the existence of a value in general limit-average stochastic games has been extensively
studied, the computation of values has received less attention.1 In general, it may happen that a
game with rational rewards and rational transition probabilities still has an irrational value [15].
Hence, we can only hope to have approximation algorithms that compute the value of a game up to
a given approximation ε, for a real ε > 0. Even the approximation of values is not simple, because
in general limit-average games only admit η-optimal strategies, for all reals η > 0, rather than
optimal strategies [5], and the η-optimal strategies of [11] require infinite memory. This precludes,
for example, common algorithmic techniques that enumerate over certain finite sets of strategies
and, having fixed a strategy, solve the resulting Markov decision process using linear programming
techniques [6]. Most research has therefore characterized particular subclasses of games for which
stationary optimal strategies exist (a stationary strategy is independent of the history of a play
and depends only on the current state) [14, 8] (see [6] for a survey), and the main algorithmic tool
has been value or policy iteration, which can be shown to terminate in an exponential number of
steps (but often behaves better in practice) for many of these particular classes.
In this paper, we characterize the computational complexity of approximating the value of a
limit-average game. We show that for any given real ε > 0, the value of a game G at a state can
be computed to within ε-precision in time bounded by an exponential in a polynomial in the size
of the game G times a polynomial function of log 1
ε
. This shows that approximating the value of
limit-average games lies in the computational complexity class EXPTIME [13]. Our main technique
is the characterization of values as semi-algebraic quantities [4, 11]. We show that for a real number
α, whether the value of a stochastic limit-average game at a state s is strictly greater than α can
be expressed as a sentence in the theory of real-closed fields. Moreover, this sentence is polynomial
in the size of the game and has a constant number of quantifier alternations. The theory of real-
closed fields is decidable in time exponential in the size of a formula and doubly exponential in the
quantifier alternation depth [1]. This, together with binary search over the range of values, gives an
algorithm exponential in polynomial in the size of the game graph times polynomial in logarithmic
in 1
ε
to approximate the value, for ε > 0. Our techniques combine several known results to provide
the first complexity bound on the general problem of approximating the value of stochastic games
with limit-average objectives. It may be noted that the best known deterministic algorithm for the
special case of perfect information limit-average games also requires exponential time.
1In this paper we take the classical view of computation, where an algorithm either answers “Yes” or “NO”, or
outputs a set of rational numbers
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2 Definitions
Probability distributions. For a finite set A, a probability distribution on A is a function
δ : A → [0, 1] such that
∑
a∈A δ(a) = 1. We denote the set of probability distributions on A by
D(A). For a distribution δ ∈ D(A), we denote by Supp(δ) = {x ∈ A | δ(x) > 0} the support of δ.
Definition 1 (Stochastic games) A (two-player zero-sum) stochastic game G =
〈S,A,Γ1,Γ2, δ, r〉 consists of the following components.
• A finite set S of states.
• A finite set A of moves or actions.
• Two move assignments Γ1,Γ2 : S → 2
A \∅. For i ∈ {1, 2}, assignment Γi associates with each
state s ∈ S a non-empty set Γi(s) ⊆ A of moves available to player i at state s.
• A probabilistic transition function δ : S×A×A→ D(S) that gives the probability δ(s, a, b)(t)
of a transition from s to t when player 1 plays move a and player 2 plays move b, for all
s, t ∈ S and a ∈ Γ1(s), b ∈ Γ2(s).
• A reward function r : S×A×A→ R that maps every state and pair of moves to a real-valued
reward.
The special class of perfect-information games can be obtained from stochastic games with the
restriction that for all s ∈ S either |Γ1(s)| = 1 or |Γ2(s)| = 1, i.e., at every state at most one player
can influence the transition. If the transition function δ is deterministic rather than probabilistic
then we call the game a deterministic game. The class of rational stochastic games are the special
class of stochastic games such that all rewards and transition probabilities are rational.
Size of a stochastic game. Given a stochastic game G we use the following notations:
1. n = |S| is the number of states;
2. |δ| =
∑
s∈S |Γ1(s)| · |Γ2(s)| is the number of entries of the transition function.
Given a rational stochastic game we use the following notations:
1. size(δ) =
∑
t∈S
∑
a∈Γ1(s)
∑
b∈Γ2(s)
|δ(s, a, b)(t)|, where |δ(s, a, b)(t)| denotes the space to ex-
press δ(s, a, b)(t) in binary;
2. size(r) =
∑
s∈S
∑
a∈Γ1(s)
∑
b∈Γ2(s)
|r(s, a, b)|, where |r(s, a, b)| denotes the space to express
r(s, a, b) in binary;
3. |G| = size(G) = size(δ) + size(r).
The specification of a gameG requiresO(|G|) bits. Given a stochastic game with n states, we assume
without loss of generality that the state space of the stochastic game structure is enumerated as
natural numbers, S = { 1, 2, . . . , n }, i.e., the states are numbered from 1 to n.
At every state s ∈ S, player 1 chooses a move a ∈ Γ1(s), and simultaneously and independently
player 2 chooses a move b ∈ Γ2(s). The game then proceeds to the successor state t with probability
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δ(s, a, b)(t), for all t ∈ S. At the state s, for moves a for player 1 and b for player 2, player 1 wins
and player 2 loses a reward of value r(s, a, b).
A path or a play ω of G is an infinite sequence ω = 〈s0, (a0, b0), s1, (a1, b1), s2, (a2, b2), . . .〉 of
states and pairs of moves such that (ai, bi) ∈ Γ1(si) × Γ2(si) and si+1 ∈ Supp(δ(si, ai, bi)), for all
i ≥ 0. We denote by Ω the set of all paths, and by Ωs the set of all paths starting from state s.
Randomized strategies. A strategy for player 1 is a function σ : (S × A × A)∗ · S → D(A)
that associates with every prefix of a play, representing the history of the play so far, and the
current state a probability distribution from D(A) such that for all w ∈ (S × A × A)∗ and all
s ∈ S, we have Supp(σ(w · s)) ⊆ Γ1(s). Observe that the strategies can be randomized (i.e., not
necessarily deterministic) and history-dependent (i.e., not necessarily stationary). Similarly we
define strategies π for player 2. We denote by Σ and Π the sets of strategies for player 1 and player
2, respectively.
Once the starting state s and the strategies σ and π for the two players have been chosen, the
game is reduced to a stochastic process. Hence, the probabilities of events are uniquely defined,
where an event E ⊆ Ωs is a measurable set of paths. For an event E ⊆ Ωs, we denote by Pr
σ,π
s (E)
the probability that a path belongs to E when the game starts from s and the players follow the
strategies σ and π. We denote by Eσ,πs [·] the associated expectation operator with the probability
measure Prσ,πs (·). For i ≥ 0, we denote by Xi : Ω→ S the random variable denoting the i-th state
along a path, and for j ∈ { 1, 2 }, we denote by Θi,j : Ωs → A the random variable denoting the
move of player j in the i-th round of a play.
Limit-average payoff. Let σ and π be strategies of player 1 and player 2, respectively. The
limit-average payoff v1(s, σ, π) for player 1 at a state s, for the strategies σ and π, is defined as
v1(s, σ, π) = E
σ,π
s lim inf
N→∞
[
1
N
·
N∑
i=1
r(Xi,Θi,1,Θi,2)
]
.
Similarly, for player 2, the payoff v2(s, σ, π) is defined as
v2(s, σ, π) = E
σ,π
s lim sup
N→∞
[
1
N
·
N∑
i=1
−r(Xi,Θi,1,Θi,2)
]
.
In other words, player 1 wins and player 2 looses the “long-run” average of the rewards of the play.
A stochastic game G with limit-average payoff is called a stochastic limit-average game.
Given a state s ∈ S and we are interested in finding the maximal payoff that player 1 can
ensure against all strategies for player 2, and the maximal payoff that player 2 can ensure against
all strategies for player 1. We call such payoff the value of the game G at s for player i ∈ { 1, 2 }.
The values for player 1 and player 2 are defined for all s ∈ S by
v1(s) = supσ∈Σ infπ∈Π v1(s, σ, π) and v2(s) = supπ∈Π infσ∈Σ v2(s, σ, π).
Mertens and Neyman [11] established the determinacy of stochastic limit-average games.
Theorem 1 [11] For all stochastic limit-average games G and for all states s of G, we have
v1(s) + v2(s) = 0.
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Stronger notion of existence of values [11]. The values for stochastic limit-average games
exist in a strong sense: for all reals ε > 0, there exist strategies σ∗ ∈ Σ, π∗ ∈ Π such that the
following conditions hold:
1. for all σ ∈ Σ and π ∈ Π, we have
− ε+ Eσ,π
∗
s lim sup
N→∞
[
1
N
·
N∑
i=1
r(Xi,Θi,1,Θi,2)
]
≤ Eσ
∗,π
s lim inf
N→∞
[
1
N
·
N∑
i=1
r(Xi,Θi,1,Θi,2)
]
+ ε; (1)
2. there exists an integer N0 such that for all σ ∈ Σ and π ∈ Π, for all integers N ≥ N0, we have
− ε+ Eσ,π
∗
s
[
1
N
·
N∑
i=1
r(Xi,Θi,1,Θi,2)
]
≤ Eσ
∗,π
s
[
1
N
·
N∑
i=1
r(Xi,Θi,1,Θi,2)
]
+ ε. (2)
3. there exists 0 < β0 < 1 such that for all σ ∈ Σ and π ∈ Π, for all 0 < β ≤ β0, we have
− ε+ Eσ,π
∗
s
[
β ·
∞∑
i=1
(1− β)i−1r(Xi,Θi,1,Θi,2)
]
≤ Eσ
∗,π
s
[
β ·
∞∑
i=1
(1− β)i−1r(Xi,Θi,1,Θi,2)
]
+ ε. (3)
Let v1(s, σ, π) = E
σ,π
s lim sup
N→∞
[
1
N
·
N∑
i=1
r(Xi,Θi,1,Θi,2)
]
, then (1) is equivalent to the following
equality:
sup
σ∈Σ
inf
π∈Π
v1(s, σ, π) = inf
π∈Π
sup
σ∈Σ
v1(s, σ, π).
3 Theory of Real-closed Fields and Quantifier Elimination
Our main technique is to represent the value of a game as a formula in the theory of real-closed fields.
We denote by R the real-closed field (R,+, ·, 0, 1,≤) of the reals with addition and multiplication.
In the sequel we write “real-closed field” to denote the real-closed field R. An atomic formula
is an expression of the form p < 0 or p = 0, where p is a (possibly) multi-variate polynomial
with coefficients in the real-closed field. Coefficients are rationals or symbolic constants (e.g., the
symbolic constant e stands for 2.71828 . . .). We will consider the special case when only rational
coefficients of the form q1
q2
, where q1, q2 are integers, are allowed. A formula is constructed from
atomic formulas by the grammar
ϕ ::= a | ¬a | ϕ ∧ ϕ | ϕ ∨ ϕ | ∃x.ϕ | ∀x.ϕ,
where a is an atomic formula, ¬a denotes complement of a, ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 denotes conjunction of ϕ1
and ϕ2, ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2 denotes disjunction of ϕ1 and ϕ2, and ∃ and ∀ denote existential and universal
quantification, respectively. We use the standard abbreviations such as p ≤ 0, p ≥ 0 and p > 0 that
are derived as follows:
p ≤ 0 (for p < 0 ∨ p = 0), p ≥ 0 (for ¬(p < 0)), and p > 0 (for ¬(p ≤ 0)).
The semantics of formulas are given in a standard way. A variable x is free in the formula ϕ if it is
not in the scope of a quantifier ∃x or ∀x. A sentence is a formula with no free variables. A formula
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is quantifier-free if it does not contain any existential or universal quantifier. Two formulas ϕ1 and
ϕ2 are equivalent if the set of free variables of ϕ1 and ϕ2 are the same, and for every assignment
to the free variables the formula ϕ1 is true if and only if the formula ϕ2 is true. A formula ϕ
admits quantifier elimination if there is an algorithm to convert it to an equivalent quantifier-free
formula. A quantifier elimination algorithm takes as input a formula ϕ and returns an equivalent
quantifier-free formula, if one exists.
Tarski proved that every formula in the theory of real-closed fields admits quantifier elimination,
and (by way of quantifier elimination) that there is an algorithm to decide the truth of a sentence
ϕ in the theory of real-closed fields (see [18] for algorithms that decide the truth of a sentence ϕ
in the theory of real-closed fields). The complexity of the algorithm of Tarski has subsequently
improved, and we now present a result of Basu [1] on the complexity of quantifier elimination for
formulas in the theory of the real-closed field.
Complexity of quantifier elimination. We first define the length of a formula ϕ, and then
define the size of a formula with rational coefficients. We denote the length and size of ϕ as len(ϕ)
and size(ϕ), respectively. The length of a polynomial p is defined as the sum of the length of its
constituent monomials plus the number of monomials in the polynomial. The length of a monomial
is defined as its degree plus the number of variables plus 1 (for the coefficient). For example, for
the monomial 14 · x
3 · y2 · z, its length is 6 + 3 + 1 = 10. Given a polynomial p, the length of both
p < 0 and p = 0 is len(p) + 2. This defines the length of an atomic formula a. The length of a
formula ϕ is inductively defined as follows:
len(¬a) = len(a) + 1;
len(ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2) = len(ϕ1) + len(ϕ2) + 1;
len(ϕ1 ∨ ϕ2) = len(ϕ1) + len(ϕ2) + 1;
len(∃x.ϕ) = len(ϕ) + 2;
len(∀x.ϕ) = len(ϕ) + 2.
Observe that the length of a formula is defined for formulas that may contain symbolic constants
as coefficients. For formulas with rational coefficients we define its size as follows: the size of ϕ, i.e.,
size(ϕ), is defined as the sum of len(ϕ) and the space required to specify the rational coefficients
of the polynomials appearing in ϕ in binary. We state a result of Basu [1] on the complexity
of quantifier elimination for the real-closed field. The following theorem is a specialization of
Theorem 1 of [1]; also see Theorem 14.14 and Theorem 14.16 of [2].
Theorem 2 [1] Let d, k,m be nonnegative integers, X = {X1,X2, . . . ,Xk } be a set of k variables,
and P = { p1, p2, . . . , pm } be a set of m polynomials over the set X of variables, each of degree at
most d and with coefficients in the real-closed field. Let X[r],X[r−1], . . . ,X[1] denote a partition of
the set X of variables into r subsets such that the set X[i] of variables has size ki, i.e., ki = |X[i]|
and
∑r
i=1 ki = k. Let
Φ = (QrX[r]). (Qr−1X[r−1]). · · · .(Q2X[2]). (Q1X[1]). ϕ(p1, p2, . . . , pm)
be a sentence with r alternating quantifiers Qi ∈ { ∃,∀ } (i.e., Qi+1 6= Qi), and ϕ(p1, p2, . . . , pm) is
a quantifier-free formula with atomic formulas of the form pi ⊲⊳ 0, where ⊲⊳ ∈ { <,>,= }. Let D
denote the ring generated by the coefficients of the polynomials in P. Then the following assertions
hold.
6
1. There is an algorithm to decide the truth of Φ using
m
Q
i(ki+1) · d
Q
iO(ki) · len(ϕ)
arithmetic operations (multiplication, addition, and sign determination) in D.
2. If D = Z (the set of integers) and the bit sizes of the coefficients of the polynomials are
bounded by γ, then the bit sizes of the integers appearing in the intermediate computations of
the truth of Φ is bounded by
γ · d
Q
iO(ki).
The result of part 1 of Theorem 2 holds for sentences with symbolic constants as coefficients.
The result of part 2 of Theorem 2 is for the special case of sentences with only integer coefficients.
Part 2 of Theorem 2 follows from the results of [1], but is not explicitly stated as a theorem there;
for an explicit statement as a theorem, see Theorem 14.14 and Theorem 14.16 of [2].
Remark 1 Given two integers a and b, let |a| and |b| denote the space to express a and b in binary,
respectively. The following assertions hold: given integers a and b,
1. given signs of a and b, the sign determination of a+ b can be done in O(|a|+ |b|) time, i.e., in
linear time, and the sign determination of a · b can be done O(1) time, i.e., in constant time;
2. addition of a and b can be done in O(|a|+ |b|) time, i.e., in linear time; and
3. multiplication of a and b can be done in O(|a| · |b|) time, i.e., in quadratic time.
It follows from the above observations, along with Theorem 2, that if D = Z and the bit sizes of
the coefficients of the polynomials appearing in Φ are bounded by γ, then the truth of Φ can be
determined in time
m
Q
iO(ki+1) · d
Q
iO(ki) · O(len(ϕ) · γ2). (4)
4 Computation of Values in Stochastic Games
The values in stochastic limit-average games can be irrational even if all rewards and transition
probability values are rational [15]. Hence, we can algorithmically only approximate the values to
within a precision ε, for ε > 0.
Discounted value functions. Let G be a stochastic game with reward function r. For a real β,
with 0 < β < 1, the β-discounted value function vβ1 is defined as follows:
v
β
1 (s) = sup
σ∈Σ
inf
π∈Π
β · Eσ,πs
[ ∞∑
i=1
(1− β)i · r(Xi,Θi,1,Θi,2)
]
.
For a stochastic game G, the β-discounted value function vβ1 is monotonic with respect to β in a
neighborhood of 0 [4].
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4.1 Sentence for the value of a stochastic game
We now describe how we can obtain a sentence in the theory of the real-closed field that states that
the value of a stochastic limit-average game at a given state is strictly greater than α, for a real α.
The sentence applies to the case where the rewards and the transition probabilities are specified as
symbolic or rational constants.
Formula for β-discounted value functions. Given a real α and a stochastic limit-average game
G, we present a formula in the theory of the real-closed field to express that the β-discounted value
v
β
1 (s) at a given state s is strictly greater than α, for 0 < β < 1. A valuation v ∈ R
n is a vector
of reals, and for 1 ≤ i ≤ n, the i-th component of v represents the value v(i) for state i. For every
state s ∈ S and for every move b ∈ Γ2(s) we define a polynomial u(s,b,1) for player 1 as a function
of x ∈ D(Γ1(s)), a valuation v and 0 < β < 1 as follows:
u(s,b,1)(x, v, β) = β ·
∑
a∈Γ1(s)
x(a) · r(s, a, b) + (1− β) ·
∑
a∈Γ1(s)
x(a) ·
∑
t∈S
δ(s, a, b)(t) · v(t)− v(s).
The polynomial u(s,b,1) consists of the variables β, and x(a) for a ∈ Γ1(s), and v(t) for t ∈ S.
Observe that given a stochastic limit-average game, r(s, a, b) for a ∈ Γ1(s), and δ(s, a, b)(t) for
t ∈ S and a ∈ Γ1(s) are rational or symbolic constants given by the game graph, not variables.
The coefficients of the polynomial are r(s, a, b) for a ∈ Γ1(s), and δ(s, a, b)(t) for a ∈ Γ1(s) and
t ∈ S. Hence the polynomial has degree 3 and has 1 + |Γ1(s)| + n variables. Similarly, for s ∈ S,
a ∈ Γ1(s), y ∈ D(Γ2(s)), v ∈ R
n, and 0 < β < 1, we have polynomials u(s,a,2) defined by
u(s,a,2)(y, v, β) = β ·
∑
b∈Γ2(s)
y(b) · r(s, a, b) + (1− β) ·
∑
b∈Γ2(s)
y(b) ·
∑
t∈S
δ(s, a, b)(t) · v(t)− v(s).
The sentence stating that vβ1 (s) is strictly greater than α is as follows. We have variables xs(a) for
s ∈ S and a ∈ Γ1(s), ys(b) for s ∈ S and b ∈ Γ2(s), and variables v(1), v(2), . . . , v(n). For simplicity
we write xs for the vector of variables xs(a1), xs(a2), . . . , xs(aj), where Γ1(s) = { a1, a2, . . . , aj },
ys for the vector of variables ys(b1), ys(b2), . . . , ys(bl), where Γ2(s) = { b1, b2, . . . , bl }, and v for the
vector of variables v(1), v(2), . . . , v(n). The sentence is as follows:
Φβ(s, α) = ∃x1, . . . , xn. ∃y1, . . . , yn. ∃v. Ψ(x1, x2, . . . , xn, y1, y2, . . . , yn)∧ ∧
s∈S,b∈Γ2(s)
(
u(s,b,1)(xs, v, β) ≥ 0
) ∧ ∧
s∈S,a∈Γ1(s)
(
u(s,a,2)(ys, v, β) ≤ 0
)
∧
(v(s)− α > 0);
where Ψ(x1, x2, . . . , xn, y1, y2, . . . , yn) specify the constraints that x1, x2, . . . , xn and y1, y2, . . . , yn
are valid randomized strategies and is defined as follows:
Ψ(x1, x2, . . . , xn, y1, y2, . . . , yn) =
∧
s∈S
(
(
∑
a∈Γ1(s)
xs(a))− 1 = 0
)
∧
∧
s∈S,a∈Γ1(s)
(
xs(a) ≥ 0
)
∧
∧
s∈S
(
(
∑
b∈Γ2(s)
ys(b))− 1 = 0
)
∧
∧
s∈S,b∈Γ2(s)
(
ys(b) ≥ 0
)
.
The total number of polynomials in Φβ(s, α) is 1 +
∑
s∈S(3 · |Γ1(s)| + 3 · |Γ2(s)|+ 2) = O(|δ|). In
the above formula we treat β as a variable; it is a free variable in Φβ(s, α). Given a stochastic
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limit-average game G, for all 0 < β < 1, the correctness of Φβ(s, α) to specify that v
β
1 (s) > α can
be proved from the results of [16].
Value of a game as limit of discounted games. The result of Mertens-Neyman [11] established
that the value of a stochastic limit-average game is the limit of the β-discounted values, as β goes
to 0. Formally, we have
v1(s) = lim
β→0+
v
β
1 (s).
Sentence for the value of a stochastic game. From the characterization of the value of a
stochastic limit-average game as the limit of the β-discounted values and the monotonicity property
of the β-discounted values in a neighborhood of 0, we obtain the following sentence Φ(s, α) stating
that the value at state s is strictly greater than α. In addition to variables for Φβ(s, α), we have
the variables β and β1. The sentence Φ(s, α) specifies the expression
∃β1 > 0. ∀β ∈ (0, β1). Φβ(s, α),
and is defined as follows:
Φ(s, α) = ∃β1. ∀β. ∃x1, . . . , xn. ∃y1, . . . , yn. ∃v. Ψ(x1, x2, . . . , xn, y1, y2, . . . , yn)
∧
(β1 > 0)
∧[
(β1 − β ≤ 0)
∨
(β ≤ 0)
∨ (
(β1 − β > 0)∧ ∧
s∈S,b∈Γ2(s)
(
u(s,b,1)(xs, v, β) ≥ 0
)
∧ ∧
s∈S,a∈Γ1(s)
(
u(s,a,2)(ys, v, β) ≤ 0
))]
∧
(v(s)− α > 0);
where Ψ(x1, x2, . . . , xn, y1, y2, . . . , yn) specify the constraints that x1, x2, . . . , xn and y1, y2, . . . , yn
are valid randomized strategies (the same formula used for Φβ(s, α)).
2 Observe that Φ(s, α) contains
no free variable (i.e., the variables xs, ys, v, β1, and β are quantified). A similar sentence was used
in [4] for values of discounted games. The total number of polynomials in Φ(s, α) is O(|δ|); in
addition to the O(|δ|) polynomials of Φβ(s, α) there are 4 more polynomials in Φ(s, α). In the
setting of Theorem 2 we obtain the following bounds for Φ(s, α):
m = O(|δ|); k = O(|δ|);
∏
i
(ki + 1) = O(|δ|); r = O(1); d = 3; (5)
and hence we have
m
Q
i(ki+1) · d
Q
i O(ki) = O(|δ|)O(|δ|) = 2O
(
|δ|·log(|δ|)
)
.
Also observe that for a stochastic game G, the sum of the lengths of the polynomials appearing in
the sentence is O(|δ|). The present analysis along with Theorem 2 yields Theorem 3. The result of
Theorem 3 holds for stochastic limit-average games where the transition probabilities and rewards
are specified as symbolic constants.
2Our detailed formulas Φβ(s, α) and Φ(s, α) can be shortened, however, the present formulas make it easier to
understand the bound on parameters required for complexity bounds.
Theorem 3 Given a stochastic limit-average game G with reward function r, a state s of G, and
a real α, there is an algorithm to decide whether v1(s) > α using 2
O
(
|δ|·log(|δ|)
)
· O(|δ|) arithmetic
operations (addition, multiplication, and sign determination) in the ring generated by the set
{ r(s, a, b) | s ∈ S, a ∈ Γ1(s), b ∈ Γ2(s) } ∪ { δ(s, a, b)(t) | s, t ∈ S, a ∈ Γ1(s), b ∈ Γ2(s) } ∪ { α }.
4.2 Algorithmic analysis
For algorithmic analysis we consider rational stochastic games, i.e., stochastic games such that
r(s, a, b) and δ(s, a, b)(t) are rational for all states s, t ∈ S, and moves a ∈ Γ1(s) and b ∈ Γ2(s). In
the sequel we will only consider rational stochastic games. Given the sentence Φ(s, α) to specify
that v1(s) > α, we first reduce it to an equivalent sentence Φ̂(s, α) as follows.
• For every rational coefficient ℓ = q1
q2
, where q1, q2 ∈ Z, appearing in Φ(s, α) we apply the
following procedure:
1. introduce a new variable zℓ;
2. replace ℓ by zℓ in Φ(s, α);
3. add a polynomial q2 ·zℓ− q1 = 0 as a conjunct to the quantifier-free body of the formula;
and
4. existentially quantify zℓ in the block of existential quantifiers after quantifying β1 and
β.
Thus we add O(|δ|) variables and polynomials, and increase the degree of the polynomials in Φ(s, α)
by 1. Also observe that the coefficients in Φ̂(s, α) are integers, and hence the ring D̂ generated by
the coefficients in Φ̂(s, α) is Z. Similar to the bounds obtained in (5), in the setting of Theorem 2
we obtain the following bounds for Φ̂(s, α):
m̂ = O(|δ|); k̂ = O(|δ|);
∏
i
(k̂i + 1) = O(|δ|); r̂ = O(1); d̂ = 4;
and hence
m̂
Q
i O(
bki+1) · d̂
Q
iO(
bki) = O(|δ|)O(|δ|) = 2O
(
|δ|·log(|δ|)
)
.
Also observe that the length of the sentence Φ̂(s, α) can be bounded by O(|δ|), and the sum of
the bit sizes of the coefficients in Φ̂(s, α) can be bounded by O(|G| + |α|), where |α| is the space
required to express α in binary. This along with (4) of Remark 1 yields the following result.
Theorem 4 Given a rational stochastic limit-average game G, a state s of G, and a rational α,
there is an algorithm that decides whether v1(s) > α in time
2O
(
|δ|·log(|δ|)
)
· O(|δ|) · O(|G|2 + |α|2) = 2O
(
|δ|·log(|δ|)
)
· O(|G|2 + |α|2).
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4.3 Approximating the value of a stochastic game
We now present an algorithm that approximates the value v1(s) within a tolerance of ε > 0.
The algorithm (Algorithm 1) is obtained by a binary search technique along with the result of
Theorem 4. Algorithm 1 works for the special case of normalized rational stochastic games. We
first define normalized rational stochastic games and then present a reduction of rational stochastic
games to normalized rational stochastic games.
Normalized rational stochastic games. A rational stochastic game is normalized if the reward
function satisfies the following two conditions: (1) min{ r(s, a, b) | s ∈ S, a ∈ Γ1(s), b ∈ Γ2(s) } ≥ 0;
and (2) max{ r(s, a, b) | s ∈ S, a ∈ Γ1(s), b ∈ Γ2(s) } ≤ 1.
Reduction. We now present a reduction of rational stochastic games to normalized rational
stochastic games, such that by approximating the values of normalized rational stochastic games we
can approximate the values of rational stochastic games. Given a reward function r : S×A×A→ R,
let
M = max{ abs(r(s, a, b)) | s ∈ S, a ∈ Γ1(s), b ∈ Γ2(s) },
where abs(r(s, a, b)) denotes the absolute value of r(s, a, b). Without loss of generality we assume
M > 0. Otherwise, r(s, a, b) = 0 for all states s ∈ S, and moves a ∈ Γ1(s) and b ∈ Γ2(s), and
hence v1(s) = 0 for all states s ∈ S (i.e., the value function can be trivially computed). Consider
the reward function r+ : S ×A×A→ [0, 1] defined as follows: for s ∈ S, a ∈ Γ1(s), and b ∈ Γ2(s),
we have
r+(s, a, b) =
r(s, a, b) +M
2M
.
The reward function r+ is normalized and the following assertion hold. Let v1 and v
+
1 denote the
value functions for the reward functions r and r+, respectively. Then for all states s ∈ S we have
v+1 (s) =
v1(s) +M
2M
.
Hence it follows that for rationals α, l, and u, such that l ≤ u, we have
v1(s) > α iff v
+
1 (s) >
α+M
2M
; and v+1 (s) ∈ [l, u] iff v1(s) ∈ [M · (2l − 1),M · (2u− 1)].
Given a rational ε > 0, to obtain an interval [l1, u1] such that u1− l1 ≤ ε and v1(s) ∈ [l1, u1], we first
obtain an interval [l, u] such that u−l ≤ ε2M and v
+
1 (s) ∈ [l, u]. From the interval [l, u] we obtain the
interval [l1, u1] = [M · (2l−1),M · (2u−1)] such that v1(s) ∈ [l1, u1] and u1− l1 = 2 ·M · (u− l) ≤ ε.
Hence we present the algorithm to approximate the values for normalized rational stochastic games.
Running time of Algorithm 1. In Algorithm 1 we denote by Φ(s,m) the sentence to specify
that v1(s) > m, and by Theorem 4 the truth of Φ(s,m) can be decided in time
2O
(
|δ|·log(|δ|)
)
· O(|G|2 + |m|2),
for a stochastic game G, where |m| is the number of bits required to specify m. In Algorithm 1,
the variables l and u are initially set to 0 and 1, respectively. Since the game is normalized, the
initial values of l and u clearly provide lower and upper bounds on the value, and provide starting
bounds for the binary search. In each iteration of the algorithm, in Steps 2.1.1 and 2.2.1, there is
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Algorithm 1 Approximating the value of a stochastic game
Input: a normalized rational stochastic limit-average game G,
a state s of G, and a rational value ε > 0 specifying the desired tolerance.
Output: a rational interval [l, u] such that u− l ≤ 2ε and v1(s) ∈ [l, u].
1. l := 0; u := 1; m = 12 ;
2. repeat for ⌈log
(
1
ε
)
⌉ steps
2.1. if Φ(s,m), then
2.1.1. l := m; u := u; m := l+u2 ;
2.2. else
2.2.1. l := l; u := m; m := l+u2 ;
3. return [l, u];
a division by 2. It follows that after i iterations l, u, and m can be expressed as q
2i
, where q is an
integer and q ≤ 2i. Hence l, u, and m can always be expressed in
O
(
log
(1
ε
))
bits. The loop in Step 4 runs for ⌈log
(
1
ε
)
⌉ = O
(
log
(
1
ε
))
iterations, and every iteration can be
computed in time 2O
(
|δ|·log(|δ|)
)
· O
(
|G|2 + log2
(
1
ε
))
. This gives the following theorem.
Theorem 5 Given a normalized rational stochastic limit-average game G, a state s of G, and a
rational ε > 0, Algorithm 1 computes an interval [l, u] such that v1(s) ∈ [l, u] and u − l ≤ 2ε, in
time
2O
(
|δ|·log(|δ|)
)
·O
(
|G|2 · log
(1
ε
)
+ log3
(1
ε
))
.
The reduction from rational stochastic games to normalized stochastic games suggest that for
a rational stochastic game G and a rational tolerance ε > 0, to obtain an interval of length at
most ε that contains the value v1(s), it suffices to obtain an interval of length of at most
ε
2M that
contains the value in the corresponding normalized game, where M = max{ abs(r(s, a, b)) | s ∈
S, a ∈ Γ1(s), b ∈ Γ2(s) }. Since M can be expressed in |G| bits, it follows that the size of the
normalized game is O(|G|2). Given a tolerance ε > 0 for the rational stochastic game, we need
to consider the tolerance ε2·M for the normalized game. The above analysis along with Theorem 5
yields the following corollary (the corollary is obtained from Theorem 5 by substituting |G| by |G|2,
and log
(
1
ε
)
by |G| · log
(
1
ε
)
).
Corollary 1 Given a rational stochastic limit-average game G, a state s of G, and a rational
ε > 0, an interval [l, u] such that v1(s) ∈ [l, u] and u− l ≤ 2ε, can be computed in time
2O
(
|δ|·log(|δ|)
)
· O
(
|G|5 · log
(1
ε
)
+ |G|3 · log3
(1
ε
))
.
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The complexity class EXPTIME. A problem is in the complexity class EXPTIME [13] if there
is an algorithm A that solves the problem, and there is a polynomial p(·) such that for all inputs I
of |I| bits, the running time of the algorithm A on input I can be bounded by 2O(p(|I|)). In case of
rational stochastic limit-average games, the input is the size of the game G, i.e., the input requires
|G| bits. Hence from Theorem 4 and Corollary 1 we obtain the following result.
Theorem 6 Given a rational stochastic limit-average game G, a state s of G, rational ε > 0, and
rational α, the following assertions hold.
1. (Decision problem) Whether v1(s) > α can be decided in EXPTIME.
2. (Approximation problem) An interval [l, u] such that u − l ≤ 2ε and v1(s) ∈ [l, u] can be
computed in EXPTIME.
Approximate analysis of games with approximate description. Let G = 〈S,A,Γ1,Γ2, δ, r〉
and G′ = 〈S,A,Γ1,Γ2, δ
′, r′〉 be two stochastic games such that
1. for all s, t ∈ S and for all a ∈ Γ1(s) and b ∈ Γ2(s), we have
δ(s, a, b) < (1 + η) · δ′(s, a, b)(t) and δ′(s, a, b) < (1 + η) · δ(s, a, b)(t),
for η < 12|S| ; and
2. for all s ∈ S and for all a ∈ Γ1(s) and all b ∈ Γ2(s) we have
abs(r(s, a, b)− r′(s, a, b)) ≤ γ.
Let ρ(G,G′) be defined as the infimum over
( 2η·|S|
(1−2η·|S|) · ||r|| + γ
)
, where η, γ ranges over all pairs
that satisfy the above two inequalities. From the result of [17] it follows that the absolute difference
in the values of a player at all states in G and G′ is bounded by ρ(G,G′). Hence given a game G
and an auxiliary game G′ that approximates G within η, i.e., ρ(G,G′) ≤ η, we can approximate
the values of the game G′ for ε > 0, and obtain a η+ ε approximation of the values of the game G.
This enables us to approximate the values of stochastic games described approximately.
Unfortunately, the only lower bound we know on the complexity of the decision problem is
PTIME-hardness (polynomial-time hardness). The hardness follows from a reduction from alter-
nating reachability [3, 9]. Even for the simpler case of perfect-information deterministic games, no
polynomial time algorithm is known [19], and the best known deterministic algorithm for perfect
information games is exponential in the size of the game. In case of perfect-information stochastic
games, deterministic and stationary optimal strategies exist [10]. Since the number of deterministic
stationary strategies can be at most exponential in the size of the game, there is an exponential
time algorithm to compute the values exactly (not approximately) (also see the survey [12]). From
the polynomial time algorithm to compute values in Markov decision processes [6] and the existence
of pure stationary optimal strategies in perfect-information games [10], it follows that the decision
problem for perfect-information games lie in NP ∩ coNP. Better complexity bounds than EXP-
TIME to solve the decision and the approximation problem for stochastic games is an interesting
open problem; and even for deterministic games no better bound is known.
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